Evolutionary Moments in the Legal Profession

Despite the theological orientation one may hold, there is no denying that humans evolve. Through birth, growth, decay, and death, our lives are subject to change. It is clear from our history that technology has had an indubitable impact on our evolution with some going as far to contend that this evolution may exceed to the point of a technological singularity or transhumanism.[1] In the legal sphere, the legal profession has continued to evolve through various historical terrains in relation to regulatory frameworks and technological advancements, all of which have had an impact on the theoretical and practical perspectives of the role of the lawyer. Through an analysis of relevant theoretical perspectives, this paper contends that the future of legal professionalism is ‘contingent’ upon multiple factors.[2] This ‘fluidity’[3] does not signal an end[4] or decline[5] in professionalism but merely an evolution fuelled by complexity.[6] Despite the impact of the Legal Services Act (LSA) 2007 on the regulation of the profession, this paper expands on Francis’ ‘contingency theory’ by identifying technology as the primary influence for contemporary evolution of modern legal professionalism. It will then be theorized that technological advancements will create irrelevancy towards professional duties relating to ‘standardized knowledge’ and place greater value on more complex and human-centered[7] tasks.[8] Due to the vast amount of empirical research conducted on this area of law in relation emerging technologies,[9] this paper will proceed to take a more conceptual approach.[10]

Initial theoretical perspectives of the legal profession from trait theorists such as Carr-Saunders and Wilson focused on the special attributes that the profession maintained.[11] They concluded that the legal profession’s traits center on specific education, training, expert knowledge, code of conduct, professional associations, and noble ideals.[12] Despite the practical relevance of these traits, Johnson has stated these perspectives are a ‘sterile’ attempt to define the strategies of professionalization and are too narrow.[13] Power theorists[14] proceeded to focus on these strategies by determining the ways in which professions claim autonomy and conclude that professional associations[15] are crucial to ensure the professions ‘traits’ are upheld and exclusive to practioners.[16]

The significance of exclusivity can be considered in relation to all theoretical perspectives and therefore transcends not only those in the legal profession but the overall determination of ‘professionalism’. In this regard, no individual theoretical perspective can be considered complete, as they all are relevant from a parallax. For example, the trait theorists are correct in determining the special attributes of the legal profession, however this is incomplete as later theorists identify collective autonomy as crucial to distinguish exclusivity over a specified area of work.[17] Larson and Abbott expand on these ideas by identifying that for a profession to hold exclusivity there must be a standardized base of knowledge that is objective across the profession to ensure legitimacy and that is void of individual preferences.[18] Abbott’s micro-analysis in the context of the professions internal claims for jurisdiction shows that ‘knowledge’ is the key component of determining exclusivity (and subsequent market control) in the legal profession.[19] However Abbott identifies that the knowledge that the legal profession holds can be considered ‘optimum abstraction’[20] (OA) because of the mysterious nature it maintains through its collective model of responsibility that is exerted by professional associations and rigid educational routes.[21] Paradoxically, this OA that creates prestige within the profession is at its core individualistic because of the greater social status and mobility that is gained from concealed expert knowledge.[22]

As the legal landscape has shifted over time, Abel argues the historical environment that the legal profession rose from ceases to exist[23] and can be considered less relevant in the twenty-first century.[24] Francis summarises this shift as stemming from factors relating to professional homogeneity, fluidity of expert knowledge, the role of the state, the role of clients, fractured relationships with universities, and increased competition and de-regulation of the market.[25] As a result, he contends that the legal profession is ‘fluid, fragmented, and uncertain’ because contemporary conditions of the field[26] call for it to be.[27] Therefore he proposes a ‘contingency theory’ to determine the catalyst of professionalism that is dependant upon the professional ‘agents’[28], field location, regulatory frameworks, and market needs.[29] Examining these factors’ affect on legal professionalism will show that not only is the future of the profession contingent, but it is also complex. It will be shown that the influence of technology and the LSA 2007 challenge these concepts of professionalism, however the former will be concluded as more impactful in the long-term due to the LSA’s inability to regulate a profession that is largely dependant on individual models of professionalism.[30]

Legal Services Act (2007)

Before proceeding to discuss the impact of technology, it is necessary to discuss the introduction of the LSA and how its liberalisation of legal services has provided the opportunity for large firms to shift away from traditional forms of professionalism.[31] Due to the LSA’s enabling of external funding of legal businesses via Alternative Business Structure (ABS)[32], prior firm structures - such as professional partnerships - have been subject to disruption.[33] This poses the conceptual interaction between structure and agency that Giddens and Arhcer[34] speak to in the sense that regulatory frameworks can influence agents within the field. However, the LSA enables much more power to the individual model of professionalism as these large firms on ‘the edge’[35] have the ability to influence traditional ‘collective professionalism’. Flood states that the LSA’s regulatory framework paradoxically attempts to uphold ‘collective professionalism’ by providing firms the freedom to individualise their business structure however they please, thus evidencing true influence on the profession stemming from other contingency factors opposed to the regulatory framework imposed by the LSA.[36] Micro-analysis of those firms that have entered the market post-LSA evidence a loyalty to the partnership model and prefer their firms to be run by lawyers[37], thus suggesting the LSA having little impact on the practical governance of the profession.

The LSA’s liberalisation of legal services challenges the traditional profession-wide[38] model because of the consequential reduction in exclusivity. This increasing fluidity of expert knowledge affects the traditional perception of legal professionalism because it decreases the OA that Francis speaks to, and subsequently reduces social and economic value of legal services.[39] Therefore if this fluidity persists, the OA that grants the legal community and its market “professional” status will become less exclusive.[40] Francis reveals that the practical duties of the profession are often masked to the public to ensure this high social and economic value, but in reality tasks relating to the ‘standardized knowledge’ are often completed by non-lawyers (e.g. paralegals, law clerks).[41] Aulakha states that the ABSs have yet to dislodge original business structures, however there has been a disruption to the traditional delivery of legal services.[42] In practice, despite some firms growing rapidly[43] from ABSs, the impact of the LSA “appears unlikely to lead to greater concentration in the legal services market more widely in the foreseeable future because the profession remains fragmented”[44] due to other institutional factors.[45] Aulakha’s findings reveal that non-legal bodies that have entered the legal market via ABS have not impacted the daily role of lawyers to a great extent as of yet.[46] This reflects what Archer labels ‘morphogenic theory’[47] because of (a) the resources and power that professional agents require in order to influence an individual model of professionalism to the collective, and (b) the need for insight on the sociology of the profession.[48] This shows that although the LSA has the ability to affect traditional legal professionalism through the fracturing of expert knowledge, it is not the primary factor of influence.[49]

Sociologically speaking, this ‘commercialised professionalism’[50] existent within the culture of large corporate firms can be seen as a shift from the traditional theoretical values of the profession because of the emphasis placed on “getting the job done opposed to existing within the regulatory frameworks imposed by the professional bodies”[51]. Rather large corporate firms do still encompass collective professionalism[52] however the collective control over entry remains weak[53] and has resulted in a continued lack of diversity within the profession. Despite the Legal Services Board (LSB) and LSA’s aims to encourage diversity within the workforce,[54] exclusionary and demarcationary strategies to ensure occupational control of the market and professional habitus have remained.[55] The legal profession has made progress[56] with diversification in recent years although inequality still exists (particularly at the partnership level) thus evidencing a homogenized profession. Not only do statistics[57] show that firms typically select for certain ‘cultural capital’,[58] but Abel’s identification of past educational systems centering admittance to the ‘standardized knowledge’ as more an effort to select those of a certain socio-economic background opposed to developing good educational standards.[59]

Additionally, the Solicitors Qualifying Examinations (SQE) proposals[60] (and LSA alike) were introduced with hopes of widening the scope of legal professionals and services offered, thus exemplifying the influence that capitalism and globalisation have had on the profession.[61] In the context of the market, the proposals for the SQE would not require any prior legal education therefore impacting the profession’s ability to claim expert knowledge and maintain social value.[62] This is troublesome with respect to legal professionalism for two reasons. First, the market for legal education is likely to decrease because the requirement to obtain it is no longer a necessity within the regulatory framework, thus further fracturing relationships with universities.[63] Second, similar to the LSA, enabling a wider scope of individuals access to the profession will increase market competition and in turn decrease occupational and market control. Having said that, similar to the impact of the LSA, the affect of the SQE is likely to be contingent on factors relating to individual models of professionalism because professional agents with field location on the edge will determine the impact of the SQE on the profession based on the market’s needs. Bourdieu highlights that the habitus of the profession can change with its environment if the agents (i.e. firms fielded on the edge) embrace those changes by altering the traditional perception of cultural capital,[64] yet this evidence of exclusionary and demarcationary closure indicates that field location is more influential than the regulatory framework because of large firms’ ability to control the market and habitus of the profession.

This section has analyzed the impact of the LSA with respect to the ‘end of legal professionalism’[65] and has argued hitherto that it does have the ability to alter theoretical perspectives on the profession by way of liberalising exclusivity that will in turn decrease the professions ability to claim expert knowledge and maintain upwards social and economic status. Nevertheless, the LSA has shown to be of minor influence on professionalism as findings indicate that the results of the LSA (specifically relating to ABS) have been for the most part underwhelming with no likeliness to exceed in upcoming years. The minor impact[66] that the LSA has had on professionalism can be said to stem from the profession’s ability to self-regulate through individual models of professionalism. The LSA is indeed an encompassment of both collective and individual models of professionalism,[67] however its success has been largely contingent on the influence of professional agents, their field location, and the needs of the market. This argument of the LSA being of little impact due individual models of professionalism taking affect can be confirmed by the professions historical ability to control habitus through exclusionary and demarcationary strategies, and its ability to maintain its claim of ‘expert knowledge’ and subsequent market control through rigid admittance standards. The backlash against the introduction of the SQE evidences that despite any collective attempt to influence the concept of legal professionalism, its impact will be contingent upon what the market needs and how the professional agents fielded on the edge are willing to evolve.

Technology

As the historical environment in which the legal profession arose in begins to evolve[68], so must what is considered ‘professionalism’.[69] Francis highlights that in the context of professional services, fluidity is most prominent with respect to competition of the profession’s expert knowledge.[70] An overarching theme of this paper rests in the importance of the profession claiming exclusiveness to this expert knowledge in order to maintain economic and social prestige. The impact of the LSA has shown to be of minor impact on this exclusivity to the expert knowledge because through a morphogenic approach, individual agents have the ability to influence how the profession will evolve within the structure imposed by the regulatory framework.[71] Conversely, advances in technology can be considered the primary contingent factor that can impact legal professionalism in the long-term because of its ability to disrupt the ‘standardized knowledge’ and its distribution of practical expertise that the profession claims exclusivity to. As a result, this paper contends that technology will impose an evolution[72] on the profession towards more complex and human-centered tasks.

The first element to be considered in regard to technology is its practical impact on the profession. This paper claims technological advancements as the primary contingency factor because of its ability to break the profession’s monopoly on its OA.[73] Simpson acknowledges that professional work does involve complex issues that require judgement and traits that technology is (at this point) incapable of, however much of the daily legal duties can be considered structured and repetitive.[74] This is where technology is of the most immediate disruption because advancements such as e-discovery, online accessibility to legislation and judicial decisions, outsourcing of legal advice, and virtual spaces (e.g. courtrooms, dispute resolution/collaborative meetings) [75] all have the ability to alter professional habitus.[76] Duties relating to the standard knowledge that are often conducted by paraprofessionals have shown to be at a high risk of irrelevancy[77] if the OA of the profession is clarified, and technology could reveal this in two ways. First, an increased usage of the advancements discussed above (e.g. e-discovery) in the context of ‘repetitive and structural’ tasks can produce results much more efficiently than any lawyer or paraprofessional.[78] Second, the ability for clients to share their experiences and compare reviews, prices, and knowledge, can lead to an increase in market competition.[79] Johnsons states that the clear winner from this fluidity is the consumer due to the “growing availability and affordable legal services”, yet the extent that the legal profession ‘loses’ is highly contingent other marketplace factors. This relates to the overall complexity and contingency surrounding legal professionalism in the sense that technological advancements, professional agents, and the markets all simultaneously affect one another.

Theoretically, it is important to consider that technology’s disruption of the decline in traditional perceptions of professionalism is contingent on how the market reacts to these advancements and the existential outlook of those classifying the shift in the profession. Katharni classifies commentary surrounding the influence of technology into three existential groups:[80] (i) pragmatists[81], (ii) evolutionists[82], and (iii) traditionalists[83].[84] However, Katharni fails to consider the complexity and contingency underlining this issue because although categorizing these existential outlooks may be of value to assess theorists such as Abel and Susskind[85] that signal a decline in legal professionalism, it does not acknowledge the interconnectivity amongst all interpretations. For example, technological advancements that disrupt duties relating to the standardized knowledge can be viewed by members with economic interest in firms[86] and consumers through the lens of the pragmatists as an incline to professionalism because of the economic feasibility that it may entail. Yet from a parallax, paraprofessionals may view it oppositely due to the risk these advancements may have on their employment opportunities and can therefore be considered traditionalists; but the outlook on professionalism remains contingent on the use of the technology and the market and is therefore more accurately viewed, as Paterson states, a re-negotiation.[87]

Yoon identifies that new technologies indicate an evolution from artificial intelligent (AI) to intelligence augmentation (IA).[88] The difference being that AI replicates human tasks - and therefore infringes on employment opportunities and de-values duties related to the standardized knowledge – whereas IA entail humans still performing the task but interactively with the technology.[89] Susskind similarly identifies these advancements as providing two futures for the profession of (a) automation to pre-existing practices and (b) innovative technology that delivers professional service. He theorizes that these two futures run parallel and contends that the latter will dominant over traditional concepts of professionalism in the long-term.[90] Yoon continues by relating this fluidity in legal professionalism to that of accountants and the introduction of Microsoft Excel.[91] In the accounting profession, the standard knowledge granting them exclusivity was mathematics and when technology was introduced that could complete calculations more efficiently, the professionalism of accountancy did not vanish but merely evolved to encompass more complex tasks and less mundane duties.[92] Therefore technology can only be considered to signal the ‘end of professionalism’ if it is not used in a pragmatic manner that benefits the market and evolves the profession.

The manner in which this evolution of professionalism is likely to take place rests in a shift towards less mundane tasks and an emphasis on more complex, human-centered duties. The challenging role of the lawyer is its multi-dimensionality[93] and with the emergence of technology that can disrupt the standardized knowledge, the profession has an opportunity to evolve into further understandings of human needs and their complexity.[94] Jackson states that the legal profession’s exclusivity is two-tiered; first there is the access to the standardized knowledge, and second there is a matter of what happens with that standardized knowledge.[95] Until this point, professionalism has been claimed through exclusivity to both tiers and has managed to maintain its habitus against disruptions (such as the LSA) through individual models of professionalism. In contrast, technology is more impactful because of its ability to disrupt the OA and the way in which expertise is distributed. It is worth noting that future technology[96] could have the ability to conduct human-centered tasks, yet this consideration is more a matter of moral and ethical concerns that are not exclusive to the legal profession. Susskind identifies two questions we must ask with respect to granting technology this much control. First, are there duties in which we do not want technology to control (e.g. life sentencing, mediation) and second, who will be in control of these machines.[97] Therefore despite a computers ability to think, the unknown depths of its consciousness makes it unlikely that technology will surpass human-centered tasks due to a machines inability to apply human consciousness to issues that require such.[98]

If the accessibility to the standard knowledge of the profession becomes more democratized, legal professionalism may continue if it evolves their archetype to emphasize the way in which that knowledge is used. This analysis broadly relates what theorists have labelled ‘archetype theory’[99] by which organisations alter their archetype “in order to cement a stable, coherent interpretative scheme to produce efficiency in the market and organizational coherent”[100] and this evolution can take multiple forms that are contingent upon the area of practice and market needs. A prime example of this evolution can be seen in the modern role of the family lawyer. From a theoretical perspective, areas such as family law have seen a disruption[101] in recent years to their OA, yet their professionalism has not ceased with the introduction of the LSA or new technology because this area of the profession has evolved to encompass more complex tasks (such as dispute resolution and collaborative practice).[102] Melville and Laing conclude that this evolution does not signal an ‘end to professionalism’, but that the traditional perception of family law stems from a legal culture that values “long hours, adversarialism, and competition”[103] which in turn has fuelled this shift from a paternal to commercial ideology of the profession.[104] Therefore it can be concluded that if other areas of law (e.g. commercial) do not evolve into human-centred and less mundane duties  - such as emotional intelligence and socio-legal issues – then these other areas of legal professionalism could fail for its hubris in light of new technology.

Evolving away from mundane tasks that are easily replaceable by new technologies and moving towards the embracement of roles that are more complex and human-centered can not only sustain legal professionalism, but also grants the ability to alter the profession’s negative perception presently in popular culture.[105]

Considering ethical perceptions of the profession are inherently linked to its shift towards commercialisation, the ability for technological advancements to force the market and its professional agents to evolve towards more valued duties could aid the to the profession’s fragmentation.[106] This view is in line with Flood (who contrasts Susskind) in the sense that through this future of professionalism lawyers will need to expand their capacity for ethos and trust, which cannot be accomplished in a purely digital landscape.[107] Through its democratization of knowledge, and potential disruption to the professions traditional spatial and temporal structure, technology can provide an opportunity to more accurately reflect the profession’s “lofty claims”[108] of guardianship and advisor opposed to the modern values of greed[109] because that is what will be required in a technologically literate market.

[1] Kurzweil R, The Singularity Is near: When Humans Transcend Biology (Duckworth 2016, originally published 2005); Shanahan M, The Technological Singularity (The MIT Press 2015); Taylor T, The Artificial Ape: How Technology Changed the Course of Human Evolution (Palgrave Macmillan 2010); Harari Yuval Noaḥ, Homo Deus: a Brief History of Tomorrow (Harper Perennial 218); O'Connell M, To Be a Machine (Granta 2018).

[2] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016)

[3] For the purposes of this paper, ‘fluidity’ will refer to the shift(s) of the profession.

[4] Susskind R, The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services  (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008).

[5] Abel R, “Between Market and State: The Legal Profession in Turmoil” 53 Modern Law Review, 285.

[6] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 173; Paterson A, “Professionalism and the Legal Services Market” (1996) 3 International Journal of the Legal Profession, 137.

[7] For the purposes of this paper, ‘human-centered’ refers to the roles of the lawyers that deal with the application of social and emotional skills to clients needs (e.g. discretion, guardianship, dispute resolution, etc.). 

[8] It is worth noting that this thesis follows mainly Susskind’s ‘paraprofessional model’ but the other six models he proposes, although not directly mentioned, are applicable throughout. See Susskind R, “The Future of the Professions: Lecture” (20 June 2017), slide 33 from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122397/presentation%20Daniel%20SUSSKIND%20EP%2020-06-2017.pdf.

[9] See mainly Jackson D, “Human-Centered Legal Tech: Integrating Design in Legal Education” (2016) 50 The Law Teacher 82; Newbery-Jones C, “Answering the call of duty: the phenomenology of justice in twenty-first-century video games” (2015) 9 Law and Humanities, 78-102; Johnson C, “Leveraging Technology to Deliver Legal Services” (2009) 23 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 259-283.

[10] Few practical examples of upcoming technological advancements (e.g. cloud computing, virtual courts) will be gone into detail to prevent discursive writing on topics that have previously received much academic attention.

[11] Carr-Saunders A and Wilson P, The Professions (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1933) 280-290.

[12] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 16.

[13] Ibid, citing Johnson T, Professions and Power (London: Macmillan) 10.

[14] Such as Johnson and Freidson: see Johnson T, Professions and Power (London: Macmillan 1972); Freidson E, Professional Powers: a Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge (University of Chicago Press 1988).

[15] E.g. the Law Society of England and Wales, Solicitors Regulation Authority, Legal Services Board.

[16] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 16

[17] See Larson M, the Rise of Professionalism (London: University of California Press) 40.

[18] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 18.

[19] Ibid, 19.

[20] Id; Abbott A, The System of the Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labour (London: University Chicago Press) 102.

[21] Id; see also Abel R, The Legal Profession in England and Wales (London: Blackwell 1988) 140.

[22] Id, 20-22.

[23] Abel R, “Between Market and State: The Legal Profession in Turmoil” 53 Modern Law Review, 285.

[24] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 172 citing also “Kritzer H, “The Professions are Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal Professions in a Post professional World” (1999) Law and Society Review 713”.

[25] Ibid, 172-75.

[26] For the purposes of this paper, reference to “field” or “field location/position” refers to a firm’s presence in the legal market. This is typically determined by their size both employment wise and economically. The majority of these large firms and their influence on the profession revolve around the current state of corporate legal firms.

[27] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 173.

[28] For the purposes of this paper, ‘agents’ will be referred to law firms, businesses, or high level practioners that have the ability to make shifts that will influence the other contingent factors (market, regulatory frameworks, etc.).

[29] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 172-73.

[30] For the purposes of this paper, ‘individual models of professionalism’ will relate to agents in the profession controlling regulation (i.e. self-regulation from large law firms). The better field position the relevant agent is, the more impactful their individual model of professionalism is on the profession as a collective.

[31] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 137.

[32] Legal Services Act (2007), s. 72 & 90-104.

[33] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 137.

[34] “Giddens A, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press 2016, originally published 1984); Archer M, Realistic Social Theory: The Morphogenic Approach (Cambridge University Press 1995) 247” in Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 29-30.

[35] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 137.

[36] Flood, J. (2011) “The re-landscaping of the legal profession: Large law firms and professional re-regulation” 59(4) Current Sociology, 511.

[37] Id.

[38] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 165.

[39] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 25.

[40] Abbott A, The System of the Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labour (London: University Chicago Press 1988), 100-105.

[41] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 21.

[42] Aulakha S and Kirkpatrick I “Changing regulation and the future of the professional partnership: the case of the Legal Services Act, 2007 in England and Wales” (2016) International Journal of the Legal Profession, 277.

[43] See for example Knights plc that adopted an ABS in 2013 and has since seen their annual revenue increase from £9.5m to £43m. See “Growth” (Knights) from: https://www.knightsplc.com/about-knights/growth/ accessed May 3, 2019.

[44] Aulakha S and Kirkpatrick I “Changing regulation and the future of the professional partnership: the case of the Legal Services Act, 2007 in England and Wales” (2016) International Journal of the Legal Profession, 297.

[45] Ibid, 286. Aulakha concludes that this outcome within the market post-LSA indicates that other market and institutional factors such as: levels of incorporation, multi-disciplinary practices, non-lawyer appointments, and external investment, are all obstructions of entry to the legal market.

[46] Supra note 36.

[47] “Archer M, Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenic Approach (Cambridge University Press 1995)” in Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 27; see also Archer MS, Late Modernity Trajectories towards Morphogenic Society (Springer 2014) 47.

[48] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 27.

[49] I.e. the professional agents, their field location, and the needs of the market.

[50] Francis A, Lecture on “Commercial Legal Practice” (University of Leeds 2019).

[51] “Lee R, Firm Views – Work of and Work in the Largest Law Firms Research Study No. 35. (London: The Law Society 1999)” in Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016), 148.

[52] Ibid

[53] Id, 165.

[54] Legal Services Board, “Increasing diversity and social mobility in the legal workforce: transparency and evidence” (2011) from: https://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/consultations/closed/pdf/decision_document_diversity_and_social_mobility_final.pdf accessed May 3, 2019; Legal Services Act (2007), s. 162.

[55] Larson M, The Rise of Professionalism (London: University of California Press 1977) 70.

[56] The Law Society reports that in 2017 women held the majority of PCs for the first time in history with 61.6% of solicitors being admitted to the Roll being female. These trends are likely to persist in the future, as two thirds of undergraduate acceptances in law were also female. Similarly, PC holders from ethnic minorities also reached an all time high in 2017 with 16.5% of the legal population. Ethnic minorities also made up of 40% of newly admitted undergraduate law students in the same year, thus suggesting these trends to persist. See “Annual Statistics Report 2017” (The Law Society 2018) from: https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/research-trends/annual-statistics-report-2017/ accessed March 9, 2019.

[57] See “How Diverse Are Law Firms?” (SRA | How we work | Solicitors Regulation Authority) from: http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/diversity-toolkit/diverse-law-firms.page accessed March 9, 2019. (A mere 33% of partners in small firms were female, whereas only 29% were in large firms. Similarly, the total number of partners from ethnic minority backgrounds was 8%); and Aulakha S and others, “Mapping advantages and disadvantages: Diversity in the legal profession in England and Wales” (Final Report for the SRA 2017) (This professional homogeneity is even more evident at the bar as in 2017 there was a mere 36% female and 12% minority ethnic barristers).

[58] See Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 58 & 166; Sommerlad H and Sanderson P, Gender, Choice and Commitment: Women Solicitors in England and Wales and the Struggle for Equal Status (Ashgate 1998) 11.

[59] “Abel R, The Legal Profession in England and Wales (London: Blackwell 1988) 139” in Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 21

[60] In practicality, the proposed SQE would still require an individual to have a university (law or non-law) degree, however it would replace the current Legal Practice Course (LPC) and Graduate Diploma in Law (GDL) routes to qualification in addition to two-years of qualifying work experience (QWE) that offers more flexibility opposed to the current ‘training contracts’ because of the individuals option to take up to four different work placements in no specified area. See Legal Services Board final notice of approval on the SRA regulatory framework proposals. Available: https://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/regulation/pdf/2018/FINAL_decision_notice.pdf accessed May 9, 2019; “Solicitors Qualifying Exam Overview” (The Law Society) from: https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/law-careers/becoming-a-solicitor/sqe-overview/#sqe1 accessed May 9, 2019 .

[61] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 25 citing “Beck U, “The Cosmopolitan State: Redefining Power in the Global Age” (2205) International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 114 and Fournier V, “The appeal to ‘professionalism’ as a disciplinary mechanism” Sociological Review, 280”.  

[62] “Solicitors Qualifying Exam Overview” (The Law Society) from: https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/law-careers/becoming-a-solicitor/sqe-overview/#sqe1 accessed May 9, 2019 

[63] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 33-34.

[64] Bourdieu P and Wacquant Loïc J. D., An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Polity Press 2013, originally published 1992) 133

[65] As proposed by Abel and Susskind, see Susskind R, The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services  (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008) and Abel R, “Between Market and State: The Legal Profession in Turmoil” 53 Modern Law Review 285.

[66] That is at least compared to technology.

[67] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 175.

[68] See Para 4.

[69] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 175.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Archer M, Realistic Social Theory: The Morphogenic Approach (Cambridge University Press 1995) 154.

[72] Supra note 7.

[73] Simpson B, “Algorithms or Advocacy: does the legal profession have a future in a digital world” (2016) 25 Information and Communications and Technology Law, 50.

[74] Ibid, 51-52.

[75] Id, 52; Susskind R and Susskind D, The future of the professions: How technology will transform the work of human experts (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2015) 71.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Simpson B, “Algorithms or Advocacy: does the legal profession have a future in a digital world” (2016) 25 Information and Communications and Technology Law, 53

[78] Ibid, 52

[79] Id, 53.

[80] See Kathrani P, “An ‘Existential’ Shift? Technology and Some Questions for the Legal Profession” (2017) 20 Legal Ethics 144.

[81] That focus on the practical benefits technology has on legal professionals daily duties

[82] That state the legal profession (like any profession) will inevitably change with the introduction of technological advancements

[83] That state technology disrupts the inherently human work that the legal profession requires

[84] Kathrani P, “An ‘Existential’ Shift? Technology and Some Questions for the Legal Profession” (2017) 20 Legal Ethics, 144.

[85] Supra notes 5 & 6.

[86] E.g. owners, partners, or external funders through ABS.

[87] Paterson A, “Professionalism and the Legal Services Market” (1996) 3 International Journal of the Legal Profession, 137-138.

[88] Yoon AH, “The Post-Modern Lawyer: Technology and the Democratization of Legal Representation” (2016) 66 University of Toronto Law Journal, 466.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Susskind R, “Artificial Intelligence and the Law Conference at Vanderbilt Law School” (YouTube May 6, 2016) from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xs0iQSyBoDE accessed May 8, 2019.

[91] Yoon AH, “The Post-Modern Lawyer: Technology and the Democratization of Legal Representation” (2016) 66 University of Toronto Law Journal, 466.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Id.

[94] Jackson D, “Human-Centered Legal Tech: Integrating Design in Legal Education” (2016) 50 The Law Teacher, 96

[95] Ibid, 97.

[96] See for example Deepmind technology: https://deepmind.com/

[97] Susskind R and Susskind D, The Future of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform the Work of Human Experts (Oxford University Press 2017) 239.

[98] Ibid, 277-282; Susskind summarizes this concept by addressing the IBM computer “Watson” winning jeopardy and posing the question that despite the computer winning, was it aware that it had won and the what that act signals? See Susskind R, “Artificial Intelligence and the Law Conference at Vanderbilt Law School” (YouTube May 6, 2016) from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xs0iQSyBoDE accessed May 8, 2019.

[99] See mainly Greenwood R and Hinings CR, “Understanding Strategic Change: the Contribution of Archetypes” (1993) 36 Academy of Management Journal 1052; and Greenwood R and Hinings CR, “Understanding Radical Organizational Change: Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism” (1996) 21 The Academy of Management Review 1022

[100] Francis A, At the Edge of Law Emergent and Divergent Models of Legal Professionalism (Taylor and Francis 2016) 27.

[101] The increased accessibility to the standardized knowledge in family law can be evident from the high number of Litigant in Person (LiPs), however findings show that this has not diminished the role of the lawyer in the court, but underlines the value of their professionalism to distribute expertise. See “Five years of legal aid drought – the legacy of LASPO” (2018) Fam Law 362

[102] Wright K, ‘The Evolving Role of the Family Lawyer: the Impact of Collaborative Law on Family Law Practice’ (2011) 23 Child and Family Law Quarterly, 390.

[103] Melville, A. and Laing, K. (2007) ''I just drifted into it': constraints faced by publicly funded family lawyers', 14(3) International Journal of the Legal Profession, 297; Ibid, supra note 32.

[104] Pue, WW (1990) 'Moral Panic at the English Bar: Paternal vs. Commercial Ideologies of Legal Practice in the 1860s' 15(1) Law and Social Inquiry, 49-52.

[105] Travis M, “Teaching Professional Ethics Through Popular Culture” (2016) 50 The Law Teacher, 154; Friedman LM, “Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture” (1989) 98 The Yale Law Journal, 1589.

[106] Simon WH, “Moral Pluck: Legal Ethics in Popular Culture” (2001) 101 Columbia Law Review, 422.

[107] Flood JA, “Legal Professionals of the Future: Their Ethos, Role and Skills” [2019] SSRN Electronic Journal from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3315855 ; Hilborne N, “‘Reproduction of the Legal Profession’ at Risk from Automation” (Legal Futures January 16, 2019) from https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/reproduction-of-the-legal-profession-at-risk-from-automation accessed May 9, 2019.

[108] Sugarman D and Pue WW, Lawyers and Vampires: Cultural Histories of the Legal Professions (London: Hart 2003) 2.

[109] Asimow M, “Embodiment of Evil: Law Firms in the Movies” (2000) 48 UCLA Law Review, 1349-55; see also Francis AM, “Legal Ethics, Moral Agency and Professional Autonomy: The Unbearable Ethics of Being (a Legal Executive)?” (2007) 10 Legal Ethics, 131.